

~~SECRET~~



(b)(1)1.7E

January & March 2017

AFTER ACTION REPORT

(b)(2), (b)(3) (10 U.S.C. § 130b), (b)(6)



~~SECRET~~

~~—SECRET—~~

(U) In Memory of SOCS (SEAL) William “Ryan” Owens

(U) . A grim reminder of the dangers of our profession and the sacrifices being made daily.



~~—SECRET—~~

Joint Special Operations Command



Commanding General
Lieutenant General Austin S. Miller

Deputy Commanding General
Major General Gregory J. Lengyel

Assistant Commanding General - Navy
Rear Admiral Lower Half H.W. Howard III

Assistant Commanding General - Army
Brigadier General Francis M. Beaudette

Assistant Commanding General - Army
Brigadier General Frances Beaudette

**Assistant Commanding General - Air
Force**
Brigadier General John D. Caine

Chief of Staff

(b)(3) (10 U.S.C. § 130b), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Command Sergeant Major

(b)(3) (10 U.S.C. § 130b), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

**Chairman, Center for
Counterterrorism Studies**

(b)(3) (10 U.S.C. § 130b), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(U) The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Mission: JSOC conducts studies; training; exercises; research, development, testing, and evaluation; and acquisition and procurement to ensure interoperability among special operations forces (SOF), general purpose forces, interagency and foreign partners. JSOC has assigned and attached subordinate units and may deploy to support geographic combatant commanders' (GCC) training, exercises, activities, and operations.

(U) The JSOC Center for Counter-terrorism Studies provides a collaborative learning forum in a joint, interagency and academic environment that enables professional education and development opportunities; shares counterterrorism lessons learned, knowledge, and expertise; and conducts focused counterterrorism studies to inform and to influence current and future U.S. Government operations.

(U) The Center for Counterterrorism Studies produced this report under the direction of the JSOC Chief of Staff and in collaboration with subject matter experts throughout the special operations community.

(U) *DISTRIBUTION: The Chief of Staff authorizes distribution of this report outside the Command to organizations and individuals with the appropriate security clearance and need-to-know.*

(U) *REFERENCES:*

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(2)

(U) Table of Contents

(U) Executive Summary.....	1
(U) Key Findings	3
(U) Operational Narrative	5
(U) Background	5
(U) Operation (b)(1)1.7E	9
(U) Operation (b)(1)1.7E	16
(U) After Action Reviews	18
(U) Key Issues for Remediation	19
(U) Operation (b)(1)1.7E Observations, Lessons Learned, Issues	19
(U) Operation (b)(1)1.7E Observations, Lessons Learned, Issues	32
(U) Acronyms	39

ix

x

xi

xii

xiii

xiv

(U) Executive Summary

(U) The Center of Counterterrorism Studies prepared this After Action Report (AAR) with the assistance of the operational participants, the Task Force staff and guidance provided by the Command Group.

(S) This report provides official accounts of Joint Task Force (JTF) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d)

(S) (b)(1)1.7E on 28-29 January 2017, (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a) a raid on an AQAP compound (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a) Yemen. (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a) the assault force conducted clearance on while engaged by heavy and effective enemy automatic weapons fire emanating from over a dozen compounds in every cardinal direction. During the operation, four U.S. operators were wounded by enemy fire, one of whom was mortally wounded. (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

One MV -22 tilt-wing aircraft crashed (b)(1)1.4(a) and was ultimately destroyed. The battle damage assessment (BDA) included approximately 35 enemy killed in action (EKIA) and one ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapon destroyed. (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(S) (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

SECRET

SECRET

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(7)(F)

Pages 11 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4(a)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d)

(b)(1)1.4(a) [redacted] resulted in one friendly KIA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a)
arms fire, as well as approximately 35 EKIA - [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a)
and one ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapon destroyed, with minimal civilian casualties (CIVCAS).
In addition, the assault force experienced continuous enemy contact from every cardinal
direction, barricaded male and female enemy fighters on the target [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

[redacted]
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

[redacted]
(b)(1)1.7(e)

(S) Although conducted at a significant cost of human life, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a)
successfully accomplished the assigned mission to conduct an intelligence raid to exploit
CEM and increase insight into AQAP's potential external operations. Unfortunately, the
media did not characterize the mission in a successful light. The media described the raid
as killing dozens of civilians and resulting in one death and the destruction of a \$70 million
dollar aircraft. The new U.S. administration was seen as brash and unconcerned with U.S.
military or Yemeni lives. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a)

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4(a)

(U) Operation [redacted] (b)(1)1.7(e)

[redacted]
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

Pages 22 through 42 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4(a)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c), (b)(1)1.4(d)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(d)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.7E
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.7E, (b)(5)
(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(5)

SECRET

20

Pages 45 through 46 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(2)

(b)(2), (b)(1)1.7E

SECRET

(b)(7)(C)

SECRET